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Resumen
Este trabajo tiene como objetivo defender una lectura adecuada de la retórica 
aristotélica que nos permita comprender la racionalidad práctica como un proceso 
de interpretación de las acciones humanas. A partir de la consideración de la retóri-
ca como una facultad humana general indispensable para la convivencia política, se 
insiste en el impacto de la propuesta retórica aristotélica no sólo como una defensa 
de la importancia de la retórica en una sociedad democrática, sino también como 
un intento novedoso por comprender qué significa hablar de racionalidad práctica. 
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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to defend an adequate reading of Aristotle’s deliberative 
rhetoric that allows us to understand practical rationalization as a process of inter-
pretation of human actions. After the consideration of rhetoric as a general human 
ability that is indispensable for political coexistence, the impact of the Aristotelian 
rhetorical proposal is presented, not just as a defense of the importance of rhetoric 
in a democratic society, but also as a novel attempt to understand what it means to 
speak of practical rationality. 
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Citizen participation - critical thinking - democracy - ethics - moral education - 
political philosophy 
 DOI: ri14.v11i1.518 | ISSN: 1697-8293 | Año 2013 Volumen 11 Nº 01 | ICONO14 
Deliberative Democracy | 165 
Introduction
This work starts from the thesis that rhetoric, in its Aristotelian sense, is most 
properly understood as an authentic theory of knowledge, not as an art form res-
tricted to specific linguistic situations. It follows that analogy functions not me-
rely as a rhetorical strategy, but as the only way in which human beings can know 
and express themselves. Analogy is not simply an ornament to be used in concrete 
situations, but a crucial mechanism in all modes of linguistic expression, a process 
of incarnation through which meaning turns to word.
Politics needs idealising analogies. Given the contingency of human affairs, 
we will always be in need of new clarifying analogies. Constructing them is one 
of the tasks appropriate to political theory or philosophy, according to Aristotle. 
Analogies are necessary in order to make sense of complex hard-to-see phenomena 
like politics, especially the current deliberative model of democracy. The problem 
to which deliberative democracy is a solution is this: “Find a model or an analogi-
cal metaphor to clarify our sense of what democratic politics is and should be. In 
crafting this idealising model or metaphor, you must stress liberty and equality, 
and you must not rely on any particular tradition or revealed religion.” The deli-
berative model’s answer to this question is that democracy is like a shared discus-
sion among friends about matters of mutual concern calling for action. It stands 
as a rival to other solutions to the same problem: the liberal metaphor that ideal 
democracy is like a contract among individuals; the metaphor of participatory de-
mocracy, that ideal democracy is like a progressive revolutionary movement; the 
metaphor of communitarianism, that ideal democracy is like a family or band.
This essay sets out to develop three main theses:
1. The current model of deliberative democracy in its Rawlsean and Haber-
masean versions is not necessarily incompatible with the Aristotelian theory of 
deliberation.
2. The Aristotelian deliberative rhetoric model provides us with more plausible 
foundations than any other model for establishing a deliberative paradigm of de-
mocracy. On these bases I shall defend an interpretation of Aristotelian rhetoric 
understood as a faculty that is indispensable for the exercise of citizenship.
3. Rhetoric, as theorised by Aristotle, not only studies the natural human way 
of reasoning from which emerges a “technique of thinking” that makes us aware 
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and critical of the usage of words, but furthermore, it provides us with a con-
ceptual apparatus and the discursive rules for deliberating and communicating 
opinions, with the aim of grading the alternative possibilities with regard to that 
which is convenient and acceptable, and thus choosing a possible alternative and 
making the decision to follow it through as well as finding the appropriate means 
for doing so. Rhetoric constitutes a basic element of human formation.
Methods
Deliberative democracy, a North American variation of the German theories of 
communicative action which has gained huge support especially in the academic 
field, currently represents a neo-Kantian alternative to the model of liberal de-
mocracy. This model has surpassed both participative democracy and communita-
rianism and is currently personified in Habermas’ ethics of discourse as well as in 
Rawls and his followers. Both defenders of this Kantian-based deliberative model 
deny that their theory is another comprehensive or “metaphysical” theory, regar-
dless of the fact that it contains conceptions of “public reason” and “moral free-
dom” which depend on such comprehensive views, and as a result of which both 
theorists exclude Aristotle from their approaches for considering him a defender of 
some sort of “essentialism”.
For these reasons, I hope to avoid two common pitfalls in this exposition. In the 
first place, I am not trying to argue that Aristotle was a partisan avant la lettre of 
deliberative democracy. Nonetheless, and as I shall show, Aristotle provides us in 
his Rhetoric with an excellent framework that allows us to think about the question 
of deliberation (boúleusis) as a practice that belongs within the public sphere and 
which in many aspects goes further than the modern deliberative model (Bickford, 
1996: 41-53). In the second place, neither shall I argue that an assessment of Aris-
totle demonstrates that the theory of deliberative democracy is useless. In fact, 
the deliberative model of democracy implies in many ways a clear improvement 
with regard to other current prominent models of democracy. The deliberative mo-
del provides us with an alternative for both the liberal “rights talk” and the com-
munitarianists’ exaggerations in their different modalities: MacIntyre’s philosophy 
of virtue, originally Aristotelian and currently Thomist; Sandel’s ontology of the 
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community; Taylor’s anthropological hermeneutics; Nussbaum’s attempt at foun-
ding an “Aristotelian social democracy”; Bellah’s sociological attempts; Walzer’s 
theory of justice, Rorty’s “post-modern liberalism” and Etzioni’s approaches (Mac-
Intyre, 1981 and 1990; Sandel, 1998; Taylor, 1991; Nussbaum, 1990; Bellah, 1985; 
Walzer, 1983; Rorty, 1989; Etzioni, 1991 and 1996). Furthermore, a deliberative 
model of democracy allows us to question not only excessively spiritualised con-
ceptions of “activism”, “politics” or “citizenship” which have proved to be so ex-
pensive for the upholders of a model of participative democracy.
As I will argue, Aristotle discuses the question of deliberation using a style that 
cannot be taken to be a dogmatic or de-contextualised essentialism or a Rawlsean 
or Habermasean idealisation regarding what is considered to be better in demo-
cratic practices. The Aristotelian perspective represents a reasonable alternative 
to this dilemma by offering us, beyond alleged idealisations, a plausible theoreti-
cal framework that allows us not only to critically confront the most respectable 
beliefs and values (éndoxa) of any society, but also to re-think, in a manner that 
is more accurate than other modern theories, the role that character (ethos) and 
affects (páthos) play in deliberation. 
1. The deliberative model: John Rawls and Jürgen 
Habermas
During the last decades a new international order has emerged. This order is 
more global than ever before, and deliberation has become one of the normative 
bases of democratic theory. There is, however, in this context great ambiguity 
with regard to the meaning of the term “democracy”. Thus, for instance, Rawls 
and Habermas disagree with regard to the concept of liberalism and its relation 
to democracy. Rawls speaks of his theory of justice in terms of “political libera-
lism”, whereas Habermas holds a version of democratic theory that differs from 
the liberal and republican paradigms. Nonetheless, both share the idea that a 
good society must be a reasonable democracy where reason is understood in a 
non-instrumental sense. The emphasis on the centrality of reason is characteristic 
of the deliberative model and is what distinguishes it from the communitarianist 
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and participative alternatives. A democracy should promote solidarity and the 
active search for the public good, but it will never situate this good on the top of 
its table of values, for this place corresponds to reason. Accordingly, the central 
question these authors will have to address will be to make explicit the concept of 
rationality that characterises the deliberative model. The Kantian base upon which 
the thinking of both authors sits shows us a clear shared commitment to a notion 
of freedom –which defines their respective models– and which is found in Kant’s 
essay on the Enlightenment, where the emergence of “public reason” is described 
as the central element of the Enlightenment and where reason is defined not in 
cognitive terms but as obedience to the general laws that we give to ourselves as 
citizens. The Kantian Enlightenment represents the step from a guilty childhood 
–understood as the incapability of using one’s own understanding without someo-
ne else’s guidance– to maturity. When ascribing democracy to a modern project 
of enlightenment and autonomy understood in this way, the modern deliberative 
model gains philosophical strength.
According to this deliberative model, Rawls (1993) argues that a good democra-
cy emerges from so-called “reasonable pluralism”, and implies that, in an “ideal 
overlapping consensus” expressed through the principles of justice, every citizen 
embraces a comprehensive doctrine at the same time. Insofar as Rawls’ doctrine of 
justice as fairness implies a “thin theory of the good”, it also underlies its firm an-
ti-perfectionist liberal commitment. In turn, this implies focusing on the primary 
social goods understood as “means for any end” rather than as goods in themselves 
(Rawls, 1971; 1995, 132-180). The changes in the way that the primary goods ap-
pear in Rawls’ subsequent formulations do not alter their instrumental character; 
if in Theory of Justice the methodological implications employed in the design of 
the original position demand these goods in order to choose principles, in Political 
Liberalism these goods are justified by the substantive commitment of the theory 
to the conception of citizens as free and equal moral persons and as fully coope-
rating members of society. Thus, Rawls’ later work, especially his confrontation 
with the communitarianists, has emphasised this non-perfectionist tendency, as 
opposed to a comprehensive moral conception (Martínez Navarro, 1992: 55-72).
For Habermas (1990), a good democracy would be one into which the “discur-
sive formation of the will” integrates, through a process of reflexive debate, the 
core of a theory of democracy centred on discourse and in which the questions 
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of moral-practical character can be resolved in a rational way. In Facticity and 
Validity (chapters 7 and 8 in particular) Habermas (1992) points out that the 
discussion ends with a programme on the ethical regulation of the negotiation 
processes, which means that these must become as close as possible to delibera-
tion and results determined by the strength of the deliberants must be avoided. 
In his Theory of Communicative Action Habermas (1981) had already introduced 
the distinctions between System and Life-world [Lebenswelt]. In society there are 
two aspects which are intertwined but which are theoretically different: System 
and Life-world. The system is an objective reality that manifests itself in the ex-
ternal relations between the members of society. Nonetheless, in society we also 
find another reality, the Life-world, that is based upon mutual communication 
between the members of society. In the Life-world, the aim of all activity is re-
ciprocal understanding. In this sense, the Life-world is a necessary pre-condition 
for all communicative interaction. System and Life-world thus make manifest two 
different types of rationality. The System is dominated by technical-instrumental 
rationality. In the Life-world communicative rationality takes place, this being a 
tool by means of which people can achieve a reciprocal understanding. The role of 
this type of rationality is argumentation and conviction; according to Habermas, 
in an ideal situation, and when following the norms of rational discourse, people 
can achieve a perfect reciprocal understanding. Therefore, the Habermasean idea 
of communicative rationality is based upon the theory of argumentation. Howe-
ver, system and life-world were not originally separated from each other. It is a 
fact that in modern societies the system continuously becomes detached from the 
life-world. According to Habermas, the system begins to colonise the life-world. 
The Habermasean analysis is highly important in order to understand how the 
processes of deliberation take place. In modern societies, the legitimacy of our 
deliberations is not only based upon formal validity but also upon the –rationally– 
accepted or acceptable values in that society. Thus, the foundation of legitimacy 
is rooted in the life-world. 
Therefore, and even though these two versions of deliberative democracy differ 
from each other with regard to the aims and the degree of institutionalisation, 
they both share the idea that the rational consensus achieved by means of deba-
te should serve as normative guide for deliberative democratic politics. This has 
been argued, for instance, by Gutmann and Thompson (1997: 43 and 349-351), 
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who in Democracy and Disagreement suggest a distinction between negotiations 
conducted “in one’s own interest” and those conducted “for the mutual good”, the 
latter being the one that represents a truly deliberative process. In this work the 
authors indicate some of the criteria (“principles of accommodation”) that must 
govern the attitude of the citizen during public deliberation. The “principles of 
accommodation” are three principles relative to the attitude embraced by citizens 
when deliberating with those with whom one disagrees. These principles provide 
us with the standards that guide our actions in those situations of disagreement 
and require an excellence of character, as well as a positive and constructive at-
titude towards those persons with whom we do not agree. This allows us to also 
define these principles as virtues. It is the very character of morally committed 
persons who, being open to the possibility of changing their minds or modifying 
their positions, distinguish between respectable and non-respectable opinions and 
self-reflect on their own commitments.
In the first place, Gutmann and Thompson cite mutual respect. This is the fun-
damental virtue upon which deliberation rests at the same time that it is linked 
to the ideal of reciprocity. It consists of: a) recognising, above all else, the other 
as equal with regard to dignity and respect; b) showing respect and a favourable 
attitude towards those persons with whom one disagrees; c) respecting others by 
means of honestly trying to understand and assess their suggestions and evalua-
tions of their own suggestions; d) offering reasons that the others can understand; 
e) aiming to turn the best argument into the winning argument, without emplo-
ying fallacies nor appealing to feelings, but rather aiming for the argument to be 
rational.
In the second place, they cite civic integrity. This principle is shown through 
the fact that: a) the deliberators are honest and sincere, and employ reasons in 
which they believe rather than doing so for strategic motives; b) an epistemic 
attitude must prevail according to which, during the deliberation, the deliberators 
must seek the best decision rather than trying to impose the decision that best 
suits their interests; c) people must behave in a coherent manner in relation to 
that which they defend.
In the third place we find civic magnanimity. This principle is reflected in re-
lation to the arguments and reasons of those who disagree with us. It is itself 
based on two other principles. In the first place, the moral status of the other’s 
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position must be recognised. The deliberators understand that the suggestions and 
positions of others reflect their sincere beliefs and do not attempt to find hidden 
strategic intentions in their words. On the other hand, this implies opening one’s 
mind to the possibility of being convinced by the positions of others. This is the 
fundamental idea of deliberation. An open attitude must prevail which is capable 
of recognising the possibility that we might be in the wrong and accepting the 
adequacy of the theses of the other. For this reason, in deliberation, one must at-
tend to the arguments rather than the person who formulates them, thus avoiding 
accusations of ad hominem.
Nevertheless, this deliberative model of democracy is founded on a paradox: By 
trusting rationality as the only criteria, it does not recognise the possibility of 
other different but plausible conceptions of rationality. This makes a more realistic 
description of deliberation necessary; that is to say, a description that incorpora-
tes the rational values of argumentation as well as other values, for convictions 
and beliefs, which have a considerable weight in the formation of political iden-
tities, are made manifest in the processes of deliberation. A deliberation which 
does not take into account personal interests and opinions is neither capable of 
arousing credibility and trust nor of motivating and engaging citizens. Conviction 
plays a very important role in any deliberation; it is for this reason that rhetorical 
persuasion is one of the main tools of deliberation. To take these tools seriously 
and to apply them to deliberation would lead us to full democracy. Full democracy 
is not what representatives, experts, great public institutions or voters do, but 
rather the exercise, the capacity or the power of seeing oneself as part of a group 
or of a wider circle; it is the acceptance of one’s own responsibilities when being 
part of this whole and the will to act for a common good. Full democracy has to be-
gin with the practice of a civil dialogue whereby one begins to listen and to learn 
about the “other”, to see things through others’ points of view and to recognise 
and broaden our own principles and values.
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2. An alternative model of deliberation:  
Republicanism
Alongside Habermas’ discursive ethics and Rawls’ political liberalism, republi-
canism has also busied itself with the problem of deliberation. Republicanism 
differs from liberal representative democracy in the proposal of a model of deli-
berative democracy that integrates the normative as well as the empirical aspects 
of deliberation. The aim of republicanism is to find a way out from the political 
bi-polarisation between liberalism and communitarianism. Thus, republicanism 
aims to overcome both projects by means of the concept of freedom. Pettit’s repu-
blicanism, for instance, accepts freedom as the benchmark and, by means of the 
concept of non-domination, aims for freedom to be effective between individuals. 
Nonetheless, the struggle against the vulnerability caused by the problem of do-
mination grants the law and the State a fundamental role, the State in particular 
acquiring a centrality that liberal ideology denies it. For this reason, and insofar 
as it is aware of the fact that participation produces a plural society, when submit-
ting decisions for discussion republicanism attempts to promote the integration of 
different sensibilities, including respect for minorities. 
Deliberation is part of the Republican ideal, by attempting to persuade each 
person to exhibit the (public) reasons for their points of view and by minimising 
the risks of politics being converted into a business in the hands of interested 
parties. Deliberation brings to civil society that which usually, in political nego-
tiation, takes place between political parties. Pettit approaches this concept by 
means of differentiating between negotiation and debate. The first is based on the 
agreement reached between groups of interest that is beneficial for them and does 
not demand from them too many concessions, while the concept of debate takes 
into consideration all the positions that the groups can recognise as relevant. 
Both forms are also differentiated by the fact that, when making decisions, these 
are restricted only to those who hold the power of negotiating, for decisions are 
made before negotiation (Pettit, 1999: 244-245). The interest by republicanism in 
deliberation is translated into the promotion of discussion and debate in such a 
way that the individual beliefs and values, as well as the horizons of experience, 
are revisable in the light of collective discussion and debate, at the same time that 
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alternative perspectives and additional information are also taken into account. 
The participation of active citizenship through social movements, and the debate 
that takes place when making decisions based upon deliberation, offer an alterna-
tive social movement that opposes a conception of the individual who is moved by 
his own interests and who is alien to the public sphere. Debate promotes a type of 
“delegated deliberation”, alternative to a unitary model of deliberation, with dif-
ferent agents who perform different roles while deliberating and who, during this 
deliberation, express their points of view in a successive rather than simultaneous 
manner, as would be the case in a unitary model of deliberation (Goodin, 2005: 
182-196; Richardson, 2002: 130-142).
In this sense, the study carried out by Lukensmeyer and Hasselblad-Torres 
(2006) is of special interest. According to them, there are good reasons to consider 
the centrality of public deliberation in a democratic society: 1) citizen participa-
tion in the formulation of policies and in making decisions can reduce conflict; 
2) citizen participation can lead to better political decisions, which are more en-
during and more intelligent; 3) engaging citizens when making decisions is so-
mething governments must do; 4) deliberation generates competence, capabilities 
and skills; 5) citizen participation makes manifest mutual understanding, gene-
rates links of trust between citizens and governmental institutions and can cause 
changes in political skills and behaviour. Based upon these reasons, Lukensmeyer 
and Hasselblad-Torres (2006: 21-23) indicate some criteria that should orient pu-
blic deliberation: 1) it helps us clarify values; 2) it centres on action; 3) it avoids 
pre-determined results; 4) it profits from the exchange of information; 5) it fa-
cilitates discussion in small groups; 6) it involves relevant experts. As a result of 
this, according to Lukensmeyer and Hasselblad-Torres (2006: 7), the aims of public 
deliberation would be the following: 1) To inform: To provide citizens with objec-
tive and balanced information in order to help them understand the problem, the 
alternatives, the possibilities and/or solutions; 2) To consult: To obtain citizens’ 
reactions regarding the analyses, alternatives and/or decisions; 3) To commit: To 
work directly with citizens during the process in order to ensure that their con-
cerns and aspirations are continuously being understood and taken into conside-
ration; 4) To collaborate: To collaborate with citizens in all aspects of the decision, 
including the development of alternatives and the identification of solutions; 5) 
To empower: To place the authority in the hands of citizens for them to make the 
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final decision. The authors distinguish between “citizen engagement” and “citizen 
participation”. “Citizen participation”, much “weaker” than “citizen engagement”, 
promotes only the first two aims, i.e., to inform and to consult, from a conception 
based upon the formal techniques of participation that leave aside the values and 
convictions of citizens. “Citizen engagement” goes further insofar as it maximises 
the aims of citizen participation and promotes engagement, collaboration and em-
powerment from a more active conception of participation. Deliberative democracy 
plays a central role in the promotion of citizen engagement.
In many instances of his work, Aristotle insists on the importance of delibera-
tion and offers us an architectural framework for the exercise of practical reasoning 
on the basis of a deliberative discourse (Salkever, 1991a; Richardson, 1997). Never-
theless, it is important to avoid two excesses. On the one hand, it is an exaggera-
tion to label Aristotle as a pre-modern thinker or as a dogmatic essentialist. This 
is the caricature offered by those who, like Rawls (1993: 134-135) or Habermas 
(1992: 15 and 124) with their excessively historicistic approaches, are only able to 
see in Aristotle an anti-democratic and elitist thinker and, therefore, delimit the 
Aristotelian deliberative model within the borders of Greek society. On the other 
hand, however, the emphasis that Aristotle puts on the centrality of deliberation 
does not make him the father of deliberative democracy. This is the exaggeration 
that leads Nussbaum to defend, against Rawls, an “Aristotelian social democracy” 
and to formulate a founding frame, which she calls “internalist essentialism”, that 
sits on a “vague and thick theory of the good” and which serves as an alternative 
to the Rawlsean version of justice. If the political aim is the production of combi-
ned capabilities rather than the real operation, then it is necessary to establish a 
set of minimums that allow citizens to choose and to determine the course of the 
operations as well as to use them and how to use them. It is with this in mind that 
Nussbaum attempts to apply the Aristotelian conception of distributive justice to 
a central aim: to try to define objective standards and norms of quality of life in 
order to measure and evaluate, from a normative concept of development, to what 
extent people can choose to develop those capabilities that correspond to a good 
life2.  Unlike these interpretations, I would like to suggest that the Aristotelian 
deliberative rhetorical model is based on critical principles which, being neither 
essentialist nor normative, are capable of promoting citizen engagement, collabo-
ration and empowerment from which any deliberation is articulated.
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3. The Aristotelian approach
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Politics do not constitute at all a reservoir 
of immutable truths. Instead, in these texts we find a general framework that can 
allow us to reflect on practical philosophy, insofar as this is a general framework 
based on reasonings that permit us to reach conclusions that can make infor-
mation available for public discussion and that, in doing so by means of a non-
essentialist or non-normative language, propels us towards a continuous reflection 
and a constant revision of our beliefs. I take thus the Aristotelian frame to be more 
plausible, more practical and more open than the one offered by many contempo-
rary alternatives. This frame is teleological, implying that it is not merely factual, 
for it is not just a matter of explaining the particular phenomena according to 
adequate definitions; instead, it includes also the demand for understanding and 
relating these phenomena with the whole to which they belong (Gadamer, 1990: I 
317-329; Apel, 1986: II 19-49). For all these reasons, it is possible to affirm that 
the hermeneutical framework offered by Aristotle is a critical framework: it is part 
of our inherent biological structure, however without this being understood in a 
deterministic fashion, but rather as a potential source from which to solve pro-
blems, configure capabilities and mould inclinations (Cortina, 1988: 166-193; 1996: 
119-134; Conill, 2007).
In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle illustrates the nature of deliberation [Aristo-
tle, NE III 3, 1112a 18-1113a 14]3. In the first place, he indicates its object, namely 
the field of ethics and politics, and, more concretely, the actions taking place in 
this field that depend on us and that cannot be determined according to a science 
(episteme), and that belong instead to the sphere of that which in a certain way 
occurs in general (hos epì tò polý) [Aristotle, NE III 3, 1112a 21-31, 1112a 34-b 
11]. It is for this reason that deliberation is different from scientific reasoning. 
Aristotle is building the foundations for the study of deliberation from an ethical, 
and not only technical, point of view. Deliberation is not something that is enac-
ted abstractly; instead, it is always concretised in a particular choice. Unlike those 
authors who argue that the current means upon which we deliberate are universal 
(Belgum, 1990: 210), which leads them to reduce deliberation to a certain “prac-
tical syllogism”, I suggest that it does not seem to be the case that deliberation 
addresses the universal. The Aristotelian efforts aim to demarcate the specificity of 
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deliberative intelligence, which is oriented towards action, as opposed to specula-
tive intelligence [Aristotle, NE VI 1, 1139a 10-11], thus highlighting the existence 
of a form of rationality of that which is contingent.
Human actions are intentional in the sense that they are voluntary (hekon), 
that is to say, it is the agent who has the power to act or not to act at the time 
of the action. As is the case of the human being, other animals are also capable 
of performing voluntary actions, given that the motivational power is neither the 
reason nor the will, but the desire (órexis), which is common to all animals [Aris-
totle, An. III 10, 433a 32-33]. The practical intellect presents to the soul, through 
the imagination (phantasía), an object of action that is subjectively considered 
to be a good. In order for this object to be turned into a principle of movement, 
intervention by the desiderative faculty is necessary, which converts the object 
represented into an end. Thus, Aristotle can argue, against Democritus, that all 
animals move by choice and intellection [Aristotle, An. I 3, 406b 24-25].
However, and in a greater measure than other animals, our desires are the result 
of learning and character (ethos) rather than of a biologically inherited reaction. 
Choice resides in a perception that responds flexibly to a concrete situation. The 
person of experience does not try to deal with a new situation by means of the 
intellect alone. Instead, the person makes use of desires shaped by deliberation, 
and of deliberation shaped by desires, and responds correctly with passion and 
with action. Choice is a capacity that sits on the border between the intellectual 
and the passionate and shares the nature of both: it can be characterised as desi-
derative deliberation or deliberative desire. In fact, Aristotle defines the human 
being as “desiderative thought” or “intellectual desire” [Aristotle, NE VI 2, 1139b 
4-5]. Nevertheless, choice, which indicates not only the intention and purpose of 
an action but also the choice that necessarily leads to the action, is an operation 
of the practical intellect that makes the will effective, taking it to the performan-
ce of the action (prâxis), and includes desire, reasonable (boúlesis) or not, and a 
deliberation (boúleusis) on the means to achieve the end that the desire proposes 
[Aristotle, NE VI 2, 1139b 31-33]. Choice is “deliberated desire” [Aristotle, NE III 3, 
1,113a 10]. Unlike those authors who understand the concept of proaíresis as sim-
ply a kind of desire which is subsequent to deliberation (Allan, 1955: 334), choice 
expresses, on the one hand, the transmission of desire from the end towards the 
deliberative means, while, on the other hand, it also implies the desiderative ex-
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clusion of the other alternatives taken into consideration during the deliberation.
Therefore, that which distinguishes man’s actions from animals’ movements is 
not their intentionality. Aristotle reserves the term “action” (prâxis) for the hu-
man being. Even though animals have sensations [Aristotle, NE VI 1, 1139a 10-
18], and therefore have experience with pleasure and pain, and produce sounds 
as signs and sensations, they lack the human capacity to distinguish (kríno) bet-
ween good and evil, justice and injustice, as well as the capacity to communicate 
through words [Aristotle, Pol. I 2, 1253a 10-18]; only human beings have the 
capacity to think [Aristotle, An. II 3, 414b 18-19, 415a 7-9; III 3, 427b 6-14]. Of 
course, Aristotle is aware of the fact that animals’ reactions are not fully passive. 
He recognizes the importance that sensory perception has in animals. Nonethe-
less, he insists on arguing that the critical capacity of the human lógos is superior. 
It is for this reason that the behaviour of animals can never be considered to be 
an action (prâxis).
Results
4. The social and rhetorical animal
Without lógos, the development of human knowledge would be impossible. At 
the beginning of Politics, Aristotle establishes that man is the most social of all 
animals, due to the fact that it has lógos, understanding lógos as the capacity to 
deliberate about that which is good and evil, useful and useless, just and unjust, 
in order to make good choices [Aristotle, Pol. I 2, 1253a 7-19].
To say that man is a social animal implies saying that the structure of our lives 
is made of desires shaped by both thought and sensations. Nevertheless, Aristotle’s 
text does not say that men are the only social animals, but rather that they are 
social animals in greater measure than other animals (Ramírez, 2003a: 220-223; 
2003b: 3-4; Salkever, 1991b: 24-30; 1991c: 173-176). By arguing that man is the 
only (“political” or even “socio-political” depending on the translation) social 
animal (López Eire, 2005: 37), many interpreters fall into at least two erroneous 
ideas regarding the sense of Aristotle’s argument. Having found in Aristotle a mag-
nificent ally against the liberal individualism that they oppose, some authors have 
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defended the superiority of political life over other modes of life (Arendt, 1958; 
Pocock, 1975: 550; Nussbaum, 1986: 345-353). This interpretation of politics as 
a good in itself clashes, however, with the comments at the end of Nicomachean 
Ethics and Politics, where Aristotle defends the superiority of the bíos theorotikós 
over the bíos politikós. In order to convert Aristotle into a biological determinist, 
other authors base their readings on the argument that affirms that «in all exists 
by nature an impulse (horme) toward such community» [Aristotle, Pol. I 2, 1253a 
29-30], and thus they do not hesitate to maintain that Aristotle is saying that we 
have a natural impulse that we have inherited biologically and that leads us to live 
together.4 Nonetheless, for Aristotle, the aim of politics is not a life in community 
(syzen), but rather a good life (eû zen). The issue is not of biologically determined 
impulses, but rather of potential inclinations that are modifiable in accordance 
with experience [Aristotle, Pol. III 9, 1280b 39-1281a 4]. In summary, that man 
is a social animal is not the result of the superiority of political life over other 
modes of life, nor is it the consequence of a biologically necessary impulse. For 
Aristotle, politics is neither an end in itself nor something inevitable, but rather 
the most reasonable mode of organising the plurality of inclinations and needs 
that constitute our biological background; it is an activity that emerges as a result 
of our desire for a good life (eû zen). Human beings are the only animals with 
the capacity for feeling what is best for them and to order their lives accordingly. 
Only on the basis of these hypotheses is it possible to understand the breadth of 
Aristotle’s text.
The sense of the term lógos in this passage is radically opposed to many cur-
rent interpretations that convert Aristotle into a sort of defender of the theory of 
speech acts. For these exegetes, Aristotle would be maintaining that the purpose 
of lógos is to facilitate the exchange of information between people, thus reducing 
the meaning of the term to that of mere phoné (López Eire, 1995: 46). Neverthe-
less, lógos is that which allows us to discover, through deliberation, the means 
and ends with which we organise our lives. This capacity of lógos is a potentiality 
that may or may not develop, for human beings are capable of living well or badly.
The marked distinction between house (oikía) and city (pólis), maintained es-
pecially by those interpreters who defend the superiority of political life over 
other modes of life, is not seen in Aristotle, for both contribute to promoting 
a good life (eû zen) (Salkever, 1991c: 181). For Aristotle, the end of a home is 
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not simply procreation, for «in the house we find, above all, the principles and 
sources of friendship, of political organisation and of justice» [Aristotle, EE VII 
10, 1242a 40-b 1].5 This highlights the importance of family where, through edu-
cation (paideía), one acquires the sense of identity that allows one to deliberate 
(Nussbaum, 1980: 395-435; Saxonhouse, 1982: 202-219; Nagle, 2006). One of the 
objective principles of education is to prepare youths so that they can deliberate 
with regard to what is just and unjust, and can then become diligent (spoudaîoi) 
and autonomous citizens, that is, citizens capable of governing themselves and of 
governing the city (Miller, 2002: 375-402; Sherman, 1997: 325-330). The task of 
the citizens is thus to judge what differences are to be promoted and which ones 
are to be rejected for being harmful. Citizens try to find, through the exercise of 
deliberation, mutual agreement among themselves that expresses their thought 
and feelings, communicating it to one another in order to be able to develop their 
life in community. This way, the differences promote dialogue, social progress and 
criticism within the framework of the pólis (Salkever, 1991a: 166-167).
5. The Aristotelian deliberative rhetorical model
In order for the human being to be able to live well, act well, norms of action 
and criteria are needed [Aristotle, NE I 8, 1098b 21]. Rhetoric, which is the art of 
moving into action by means of lógos, consists of creating discourses capable of 
convincing with regard to which course of action is to be taken in each different 
case. In this way, rhetoric shows its intrinsic relationship with ethics. Rhetoric 
offers us the common places (tópika) that provide us with general ideas about con-
crete facts, principles of action that allow us to take rational decisions. These cri-
teria do not move in the field of epistémé, but neither do they move in the field of 
mere empeiría. In fact, the development of a rhetoric that is completely detached 
from ethics and, also, from the principles that govern the creation of thoughts, is 
what will generate a bad rhetoric that is only concerned with the ornamentation 
of the discourse (Abizadeh, 2002: 267-296).
It must be noted that, in contradistinction to Plato [Phaedr. 270b; Gorg. 502e, 
503a], Aristotle does not establish a distinction between good and bad rhetoric, 
but between sophistry and rhetoric. Aristotelian rhetoric is based on the discus-
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sion of plausible opinions (éndoxa), generally accepted opinions, consisting of 
that «which is acceptable to all, or to the majority, or to the wise, and among the 
latter, to all, to the majority or to the best known and most reputable» [Aristotle, 
Top. I 1, 100b 21]. The plausible opinions (éndoxa), which manifest the trust of 
human reason in the opinions of others, emerge from experience and acquire the 
register of clichés and the common use of language. One of the aims of Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric is to counter Plato’s low appreciation of this discipline. Aristotle rescues 
the value of rhetoric from Plato, who associated it with the adulation with which 
the Sophists tended to act in his time. Aristotle begins by arguing that the faculty 
of speech «is more specific to the human being than the use of the body», and 
considers it to be one of the goods that the human being uses and the one thanks 
to which «one can be of great use when employing it with justice, and [can also] 
cause serious harm when used unjustly». The task of rhetoric «does not consist 
of persuading but rather of recognising the means of credibility (písteis) that are 
most pertinent in each case in order to be convincing» [Aristotle, Rhet. I 2, 1355b 
3-25]. A bad rhetoric does not take into consideration plausible opinions (éndoxa), 
but only apparent and paradoxical opinions, these being characteristic of a sophis-
tic or eristic argumentation. If a good rhetoric is one used to clarify a good reaso-
ning, bad rhetoric is one used to cast a shadow over a bad reasoning. If, from the 
Aristotelian perspective, rhetoric is related to the means of credibility (písteis), a 
bad rhetoric is one that does not employ the means of credibility available. The 
good rhetoric is the one that, making use of rhetorical arguments, places all the 
means that are necessary for making a choice before the listener; that is to say, it 
is one which exercises the capacity for deliberation (boúleusis) previous to making 
any choice (proaíresis) (Beuchot, 2007: 217-234).
For Aristotle, rhetoric has to do with «those matters upon which we deliberate 
and for which we do not have arts or systems to guide us, with this being in rela-
tion to the kind of listeners who cannot take in at a glance a complicated argu-
ment, or follow a long chain of reasoning. The subjects of our deliberation are such 
as they seem to present us with alternative possibilities: about things that could 
not have been, and cannot now or in the future be, other than they are, nobody 
who takes them to be of this nature wastes his time» [Aristotle, Rhet. I 2, 1357a 
2-8]. In this definition I emphasis three aspects: 1) the necessity for deliberation 
regarding what appears to us as obvious, of easy resolution or of possible resolu-
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tion in the field of other types of knowledge; 2) the limits of human nature on 
providing a solution to certain questions; 3) the probable character of that upon 
which one deliberates. One deliberates neither upon the impossible nor upon the 
natural or causal possible, but upon that on which our will depends and which 
can be different. Aristotle, aware of the fact that human knowledge is based more 
on well-founded opinions than on demonstrable truths, is of the view that the 
deductive rigour of the logical demonstration can hardly be applied to the resolu-
tion of everyday issues whereby one deliberates upon practical conflicts. This way, 
the integration of deliberation into the sphere of moral action implies abandoning 
definitively the criteria of scientificity as the only parameter of judgement.
From an Aristotelian perspective, a good rhetoric –an ethical rhetoric– is rheto-
ric 1) the aim of which is to provide means of credibility (písteis) that are appro-
priate to any argument: lógos (the very coherence of the discourse), páthos (the 
affects the orator is capable of transmitting) and ethos (the orator’s credibility and 
trust), thus allowing the orator to be in tune with the listener; 2) that deals with 
convincing, rather than with what is true, and therefore is based on enthymemes, 
that is to say, on deductive reasonings based on “likeliness and indications” which 
constitute “the body of conviction”, neither for presenting half-truths nor for per-
suading, but rather because the premises of the argument can be neither true nor 
false but only probable; unlike science, which uses syllogisms formed by absolute 
premises that automatically lead to true conclusions; 3) that provides the listener 
with the criteria to be able to carry out an informed and just choice; 4) that pays 
attention to experiences and values in which our beliefs are rooted; 5) that is ca-
pable of avoiding the instrumentalisation of others, to the extent that it increases 
our knowledge of others; 6) that is the art of giving good reasons, being aware of 
the fact that in order to make reasons explicit one must know things, one must 
know the consequences of what is being said; 7) that, by dialogue, understands 
the joint search and the final finding of a truth, being aware of the fact that there 
is no dialogue unless there is predisposition, unless there is a reciprocal credit, 
emerging from the trust that the people engaged in the dialogue can mutually 
generate in each other, or emerging from an interest in the difference that each 
of the participants brings; 8) that is capable of guaranteeing assent, because any 
reasonable person should be convinced of what has been said; 9) that provides us 
with profitable thoughts and experiences for the -often unexpected- concrete si-
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tuations that we encounter. Such thoughts and experiences can perhaps resemble 
technical rules, although they are no more than mere advice or warnings. They are 
recommendations and indications of what must be taken into account or of that 
about which one must think in order to act in certain situations; 10) that requires 
that the orator exposes ideas in a clear manner, ordering their words appropriately. 
The discourse is brilliant when its expression springs forth with strength and spon-
taneity. All good rhetoric also includes knowledge of the listener to whom one is 
addressing the discourse. A good rhetoric also takes into account the receiver -the 
addressee of the discourse- he being the one who decides whether the received 
information can or cannot be validated. Thus, the character (ethos) of the orator 
is one of the key elements upon which good rhetoric is built. In order to assess the 
credibility transmitted by the orator, the listener considers the past and present 
words and actions of the orator. Without good rhetoric, education for the soul, 
moral education in general, is impossible. The educator must not only instil truths, 
but must also make them likeable. Faced with any pretension of axiological neu-
trality, good rhetoric is the art of being in tune rather than of manipulating; 11) 
that it is a good narration, credible (eikós), capable of shedding new light on rea-
lity, translating the possibilities of finding sense beyond that which is real. Good 
rhetoric is capable of inspiring the imagination (phantasía) through the narration 
of past stories (mythoi) that constitute the memory of the community. Thus, good 
rhetoric consists of the interpretation of lived experiences. Good rhetoric requires, 
therefore, imagination (phantasía) and awareness of the right time for acting (kai-
rós); 12) that is aware of the fact that democracy is the condition that makes the 
birth and development of rhetoric possible. Good rhetoric defends every person’s 
right to free speech so that not all opinions are equally respectable. If the current 
political oratory is not anymore like that of Aristotle’s -that is to say an oratory for 
reflecting on actions to be performed or decisions to be made in the future- but is 
rather an oratory whose aim is to obtain a social and political consensus regarding 
previously made decisions as is the case in a representative democracy, then our 
possibilities for acting in defence of our rights require knowing how to use lan-
guage and, as a result, being able to analyse discourse in order to discern what is 
implied, highlighted or hidden. 
Discourse regarding that which is good and bad, useful and useless, just and 
unjust, constitutes the object of Aristotelian deliberative rhetoric [Aristotle, Rhet. 
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I 4-8, 1359b 19-1366a 22]. Rhetoric allows human beings to reason with regard to 
their actions, coordinating them mutually and seeking common ends. In this sen-
se, then, it is possible to suggest, from an Aristotelian perspective, that rhetoric is 
essential for the exercise of citizenship (Ramírez, 2003a: 235-237). Rhetoric has a 
clear political, social and citizenship-oriented dimension: the art of rhetoric must 
be useful to the citizen. This makes it possible to understand the importance of 
rhetoric, especially in a society concerned with defending the pólis, this being the 
task of all citizens. Rhetoric is thus understood here as a general human faculty 
that is indispensable for political coexistence.
The role of the orator is not to speculate regarding the ideal regime. Their task 
is to occupy themselves with the governments and the political and legislative 
application of each one of them, how this is usually understood and, above all, 
how it is to be applied. That is to say, what the orator takes into consideration is 
how each regime practices and not how they should practice. This makes mani-
fest once again the political dimension of rhetoric. However, there is a reciprocal 
correspondence between the character of men and the regime that corresponds 
to them. In fact, they are mutually determining. Human beings manifest their 
character (ethos) in their moral choices and their tendencies toward a specific end 
[Aristotle, Rhet. I 8, 1366a 8-16]. The regime works in the same way. The orator 
must consider the character of his listeners in order to know how to instil trust in 
them. This means, however, that the orator must know both the character of the 
citizen and of the government [Aristotle, Rhet. I 8, 1366a 17-22]. This knowledge 
provides the orator with a much broader field of argument. What this means is 
that the orator can broaden the quantity of arguments, not only the deliberative 
ones but also the epidictic and judicial ones. This way -and contrary to current 
ethical intellectualisms and political utopianisms- rhetoric, from the centrality 
of character (ethos), provides reason with the possibility of opening itself to the 
concrete context of its actions. Many authors have currently defended such a 
“rehabilitation of ethos” (Bien, 1973; Ritter, 1969: 57-105 and 133-179). Without 
undermining the valuable contributions of these scholars, it must be said that this 
“rehabilitation of ethos”, which implies considering the diverse genres of life, does 
not entail the consecration of the current ethos in the pólis, that is to say, of a 
life dedicated to political praxis; on the contrary, it aspires to the realisation of a 
way of life.
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In this sense, the relationship between political institutions and the education 
and development of the civic virtue and character of the citizens is inseparable. 
Civic virtue must be oriented towards the formation of people’s character; they, 
as citizens, will recognise and feel their belongingness to a permanently non-
exclusive community. From the Aristotelian point of view, the good human being 
and the good citizen go hand in hand. The characteristics that define virtuous men 
and good citizens cannot be sharply separated [Aristotle, Pol. III 4, 1277a 13-14]. 
The education of the spoudaîos does not only imply learning a set of téchnai; it 
also involves developing character virtues and promoting the capacity to choose 
well (Mara, 1998: 323). All these reflections show that a politics that takes rheto-
ric seriously is fundamental in order for educated citizens to be capable of judging 
correctly with regard to aspects of the city, if they deliberate together.
Discussion
The potential contained in the contributions made by the rhetorical tradition 
must be taken into consideration in the formation of citizens -for whom current 
education policies are being designed- given that the basic issue for a citizen of 
a modern society is the necessity for a critical command of language, for this is 
precisely what makes possible a critical comprehension and orientation of human 
action.
The concept of formation comes from classical culture and its concept of pai-
deía, which means the formation of man as man, in its specificity of being-man, 
that is to say, linked to theorein, to production as poíesis and to his conscious par-
ticipation in the life of the pólis. From Socrates to the Stoics, including Plato and 
Aristotle, but also from Isocrates to Plutarch, and later from Cicero to Quintilian, 
paideía became in Antiquity the elevated, reflective, authentically human peda-
gogical model oriented towards the educational formation of the aristoi (Marrou, 
1971). The Greek paideía was followed by Christian paideia, humaniora from the 
Renaissance, 17th century pedagogical rationalism and the pedagogy of Bildung 
that elevates human formation to common potentiality for all human beings.
In the Greek world, the relationship between political institutions and educa-
tion and the development of the civic virtue and character of citizens is insepara-
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ble. The Greek paideía responds to the educational ideal of forming citizens. The 
Greek Project of paideía implies the formation of citizens capable of governing the 
pólis. The aim is not to transmit excessive theoretical knowledge to the youth, but 
to optimise their capabilities, to bring out the best in them, turning them into 
magnanimous citizens, that is to say, citizens capable of operating by themselves. 
Capable, that is, of being virtuous, excellent, and of living their lives in an authen-
tically human manner, promoting their ability to choose well. The term paideía 
summarises the ideal of the Greek man. It not only refers to physical perfection, 
to the training of the body, but it also signifies a process of growth, of improve-
ment: how to become an effective politician, an effective athlete, a good orator, 
a good philosopher, a good ruler, a good parent. The Greek paideía served thus to 
promote the development of the arts, the teaching of all branches of philosophy, 
the cultivation of aesthetics and gymnastics (Naval Durán, 1992). During the He-
llenistic period, the Greek educative influences were transmitted through thinkers 
such as Plutarch, for whom the role of parents in the education of their children 
was a central point.
The Romans considered the teaching of rhetoric to be a fundamental aspect. For 
Quintilian, the adequate formation of an orator should develop from the study of 
language, literature, philosophy and the sciences, paying special attention to the 
development of character. Roman education transmitted the study of the Latin 
language, classical literature, engineering, law and governmental administration 
and organisation to the Western world. The grounds upon which the Monastic and 
Cathedralian schools of the first centuries of the Christian era were constituted 
were, precisely, the seven liberal arts, which were divided into the triuium (gram-
mar, rhetoric and logic) and the quadriuium (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and 
music), as we will find in Saint Isidore of Seville or in Casiodorus. 
Humanism re-established all the disciplines that would contribute to a better 
knowledge and understanding of classical authors, who were considered to be the 
purest model of humanity on the basis of which to recreate the schools of Greco-
Latin philosophical thought and to imitate the style and language of the classics, 
especially Cicero (Michel, 1960). During that period, grammar, rhetoric, literature, 
moral philosophy and history, -sciences closely linked to the human spirit- expe-
rienced an extraordinary development within the general framework of philoso-
phy, Against the dogmatism of theology, exposed in systematic and abstract trea-
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ties which excluded the living word of dialogue, Humanism developed the liberal 
arts or all dignified types of knowledge of the free man. Humanism highlighted 
the centrality of the example, of conversation and coexistence. In this sense, an 
essential aspect of any humanist project would be teaching how to speak well: 
promoting the capacity to listen, stimulating pleasant conversation, cultivating 
the taste for beautiful things and true friendship. Among others, Thomas Moore 
and Erasmus of Rotterdam defended the idea of a truth without fanaticism. Both 
worked with the aim of rescuing Christian European culture from its decadence. 
However, neither of the two allowed himself to be swept away by extreme reactions 
that aimed to solve problems by destroying the existing order.
Rhetoric played an important role in the pedagogy of some of the most important 
humanists such as Pier Paolo Vergerio (1402, De ingenuis moribus et liberalibus), 
Leonardo Bruni (1422-1429, De studiis et litteris) and Eneas Silvio Piccolomini 
(1450, De liberorum educatione) (Vasoli, 1999: 45-129). The rediscovery in 1416 
by Poggio Bracciolini of the works of Quintilian in Sankt-Gall, signals the origin of 
humanist pedagogy which owes its two most important contributions to Quintilian. 
On the one hand, the principle of the encyclopaedic formation of the individual, in 
which the technique of oratory no longer represents an end in itself as it did in the 
Middle Ages, and is instead oriented toward the development of the personality of 
the individual. For Quintilian, the orator must be vir bonus dicendi peritus. On the 
other hand, the taking into consideration of the specificity of childhood and the 
need for adapting pedagogy to particular cases.
The main features of humanist education could be summarised in three funda-
mental terms that we find in Policianus, the tutor of Lorenzo de Medici’s children, 
in a letter addressed to the prince: Tu mihi tuos liberos in curam, in disciplinam, 
in tutelam tradidisti. «You have entrusted your children to my care, my teaching 
and my tutelage». Care-discipline-tutelage. In addition to all these technical as-
pects, pedagogy has a fundamentally psychogogical role in the humanist tradition, 
for it fundamentally implies the experience of seduction. The humanist conti-
nuously evokes models, resorts to analogies, invents examples. And through all 
these mythical examples, through these symbolic functions, the humanist makes 
manifest that which he considers to be constitutive of the main aim of education: 
to transmit the art of rhetoric, that is to say, to form, principally, a complete ora-
tor (Galand-Hallyn, 1999: 131-190; Margolin, 1999: 191-257).
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In the twenty-first century, formation has become an «epochal category» that 
occupies the centre of social life. The society of different types of knowledge, of 
professions, demands a formation grounded in moral education (Rubio-Carracedo, 
1996). Rhetoric constitutes an important «ground for praxis» that integrates the 
cognitive and affective aspects of action (Beuchot, 1998: 117). This «rhetorical» 
way signifies, in summary, an important ground for the construction of contem-
porary ethics (López de la Vieja, 2003). The hermeneutical philosophy of edu-
cation, rooted in the exercise of narrative, finds in the rhetorical dynamism of 
truth in-process a mediating concept «that enriches all the structural and content 
framework of the educational experience» (Esteban Ortega, 2002: 122). Herme-
neutics, which advocates the historical-narrative and practical character of truth, 
finds in rhetoric an important ground for the actualization of formation, for «the 
truthful has neither a metaphysical nor logical nature, but a rhetorical one» (Vat-
timo, 1983: 38).
I am suggesting that the democratic exercise of modern societies demands the 
return of rhetoric and argumentation not only to the world of civil, judicial and 
economic affairs, but, primordially, to the educational sphere. The homo sapiens 
is not only a homo loquens, but also a homo rhetoricus. The human being finds 
in communication an indicator of sense. Insofar as they are aware of this fact, 
current reflections have situated communication at the centre of their research. 
Many thinkers have assigned a fundamental role to communication, recognising it 
in language, in ethics, in argumentation, in narrative, and identifying the commu-
nicative act as the one that constitutes the very rationality of homo sapiens and 
of their very cultural history (Ramírez, 2001: 115-145).
There are two pillars that sustain this idea of rhetorical formation: an active 
citizenship and a critical culture. Democracy needs a “democratic” state, but it 
also needs informed, vigilant and active citizens, as well as institutions and asso-
ciations that act as guardians of the transparency of the state, especially through 
the institutions that regulate public opinion. Democracy is, and is founded on, 
communication. The articulation of communication is a key element, the deci-
sive aspect of democracy. It is on this basis that we can speak of the necessity 
of having to constantly re-think democracy and of always projecting it from an 
ideal framework that allows it to act as a regulative principle, from which it can 
then carry out a constant critique of the real models of democracy. Furthermore, 
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to educate and form authentic citizens –homines boni dicendi periti, according to 
the Catonian definition of the orator– does not mean the formation of specialists 
on one single subject-matter, but rather signals the advancement of a model of 
education that is capable of joining prudence and wisdom and that finds in the 
humanist tradition –and particularly, in rhetoric– one of its best allies.
Notes
[1]  This study is part of the Projects of Scientific Research and Technological Development FFI2010-
21639-C02-01, “Ética del discurso, política democrática y neuroética” and FFI2012-35734, “Re-
tórica y ficción narrativa de la Ilustración a los romanticismos (en las literaturas española, 
francesa, inglesa y alemana)”, funded by the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Spain) 
as well as by the European Regional Development Fund FEDER from the European Union.
[2]  Nussbaum’s position differs notably from Sen’s, for whom the proposal to ensure a real freedom 
by means of centering the attention in the capabilities, rather than in the possession of assets, 
is compatible with a political conception of justice like that one of Rawls (Crocker, 1992: 584-
612; Conill, 2004: 175-198).
[3] In this essay I cite the works of Aristotle according to the Oxford Classical Texts editions.
[4]  For a severe critique of this position see Gotthelf, 1976: 226-254; Nussbaum, 1978: 59-106; 
Balme, 1980: 1-12. 
[5]  In this context, Aristotle underlines also the analogy between oikía and pólis, which he then 
takes as forms of coexistence that differentiate human beings from other animals (Aristotle, 
EE VII 10, 1242a 22-27).
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